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JULY 16-22,
1861.--The Bull Run, or Manassas, Campaign, Virginia.
No. 84. -- Reports of
Gen. G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, and resulting correspondence.
HDQRS. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Manassas, August 26 [October 14], 1861.
GENERAL: Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations
in the presence of the enemy on the 21st of July, I propose, I hope not
unseasonably, first to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of
the campaign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the
battle.
Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy, with a decidedly
superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage, to attack or turn my
position in this quarter, was immediately impending, I dispatched on the
13th of July one of my staff, Col. James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to
submit for the consideration of the President a plan of operations
substantially as follows:
I proposed that General Johnston should unite as soon as possible the bulk
of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of the Potomac, then under my
command, leaving only sufficient forces to garrison his strong works at
Winchester, and to guard the fine defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and
thus hold General Patterson in check. At the same time Brigadier-General
Holmes was to march hither with all of his command not essential for the
defense of the position of Aquia Creek. These junctions having been effected
at Manassas, an immediate impetuous attack of our combined armies upon
General McDowell was to follow as soon as he approached my advanced
positions at and around Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable
result, as I submitted, of his complete defeat and the
destruction or capture of his army. This accomplished, the Army of the
Shenandoah, under General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces, and
rejoined as he returned by the detachments left to hold the mountain passes,
was to march back rapidly into the valley, fall upon and crush Patterson
with a superior force wheresoever he might be found. This I confidently
estimated could be achieved within fifteen days after General Johnston
should march from Winchester for Manassas. Meanwhile I was to occupy the
enemy's works on this side of the Potomac if, as I anticipated, he had been
so routed as to enable me to enter them with him; or if not, to retire again
for a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having
been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would re-enforce General
Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to his opponent, General
McClellan, and able to defeat that officer. This done, General Garnett was
to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to
cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people as
he advanced to the recovery of their political rights and the defense of
their homes and families from an offensive invader, and then march to the
investment of Washington in the rear, whilst I resumed the offensive in
front. This plan of operations, you are aware, was not accepted at the time,
from considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than counterbalance
its proposed advantages.
Informed of these views, and of the decision of the War Department, I then
made my preparations for the stoutest practicable defense of the line of
Bull Run, the enemy having now developed his purposes by the advance on and
occupation of Fairfax Court-House, from which my advanced brigade had been
withdrawn.
The War Department having been informed by me by telegraph on the 17th July
of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston was immediately
ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine, should the movement
in his judgment be deemed advisable. General Holmes was also directed to
push forward with two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry.
In view of these propositions, approaching re-enforcements modifying my plan
of operations so far as to determine on attacking the enemy at Centreville
as soon as I should hear of the near approach of the two re-enforcing
columns, I sent one of my aides, Colonel Chisolm, of South Carolina, to meet
and communicate my plans to General Johnston, and my wish that one portion
of his forces should march by the way of Aldie, and take the enemy on his
right flank and in reverse at Centreville. Difficulties, however, of an
insuperable character, in connection with means of transportation and the
marching condition of his troops, made this impracticable, and it was
determined our forces should be united within the lines of Bull Run, and
thence advance to the attack of the enemy.
General Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th July, and being my
senior in rank he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the
Confederate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my
plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his
entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command.
In consequence of the untoward detention, however, of some five thousand of
General Johnston's army corps, resulting from the inadequate and imperfect
means of transportation for so many troops at the disposition of the
Manassas Gap Railroad, it became necessary, on the morning of the 21st,
before daylight, to modify the plan accepted to suit the contingency of an
immediate attack on our lines by the main force of the enemy, then plainly
at hand.
The enemy's forces, reported by their best-informed journals to be
fifty-five thousand strong, I had learned from reliable sources on the night
of the 20th were being concentrated in and around Centreville and along the
Warrenton turnpike road to Bull Run, near which our respective pickets were
in immediate proximity. This fact, with the conviction that after his signal
discomfiture on the 18th of July before Blackburn's Fords--the center of my
lines--he would not renew the attack in that quarter, induced me at once to
look for an attempt on my left flank, resting on the stone bridge, which was
but weakly guarded by men, as well as but slightly provided with artificial
defensive appliances and artillery.
In view of these palpable military conditions, by 4.30 a.m. on the 21st of
July I had prepared and dispatched orders directing the whole of the
Confederate forces within the lines of Bull Run, including the brigades and
regiments of General Johnston, which had arrived at that time, to be held in
readiness to march at a moment's notice. At that hour the following was the
disposition of our forces: Ewell's brigade, constituted as on the 18th of
July, remained in position at Union Mills Ford, its left extending along
Bull Run in the direction of McLean's Ford, and supported by Holmes'
brigade, Second Tennessee and First Arkansas Regiments, a short distance to
the rear--that is, at and near Camp Wigfall. D. R. Jones' brigade, from
Ewell's left, in front of McLean's Ford and along the stream to Longstreet's
position. It was unchanged in organization, and was supported by Early's
brigade, also unchanged, placed behind a thicket of young pines a short
distance in the rear of McLean's Ford. Longstreet's brigade held its former
ground at Blackburn's Ford, from Jones' left to Bonham's right, at
Mitchell's Ford, and was supported by Jackson's brigade, consisting of Cols.
James F. Preston's Fourth, Harper's Fifth, Allen's Second, the
Twenty-seventh, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols, and the Thirty-third, Cummings'
Virginia Regiments, two thousand six hundred and eleven strong, which were
posted behind the skirting of pines to the rear of Blackburn's and
Mitchell's Fords, and in rear of this support was also Barksdale's
Thirteenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, which had lately arrived from
Lynchburg. Along the edge of a pine thicket, in rear of and equidistant from
McLean's and Blackburn's Fords, ready to support either position, I had also
placed all of Bee's and Bartow's brigades that had arrived, namely: Two
companies of the Eleventh Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell; the
Second Mississippi, Colonel Falkner, and Fourth Alabama, with Seventh and
Eighth Georgia Regiments, Colonel Gartrell and Lieutenant-Colonel
Gardner--in all two thousand seven hundred and thirty-two bayonets. Bonham's
brigade, as before, held Mitchell's Ford, its right near Longstreet's left,
its left extending in the direction of Cocke's right. It was organized as at
the end of the 18th of July, with Jackson's brigade, as before said, as a
support.
Cocke's brigade, increased by seven companies of the Eighth, Hunton's, three
companies of the Forty-ninth, Smith's, Virginia Regiments, two companies of
cavalry, and a battery, under Rogers, of four 6-pounders, occupied the line
in front and rear of Bull Run, extending from the direction of Bonham's
left, and guarding Island, Ball's, and Lewis' Fords, to the right of Evans'
demi-brigade, near the stone bridge, also under General Cooke's command. The
latter held the stone bridge, and its left covered a farm ford about one
mile above the bridge.
Stuart's Cavalry, some three hundred men of the Army of the Shenandoah,
guarded the level ground extending in rear from Bonham's left to Cocke's
right.
Two companies of Radford's cavalry were held in reserve a short distance in
rear of Mitchell's Ford, his left extending in the direction of Stuart's
right.
Colonel Pendleton's reserve battery of eight pieces was temporarily placed
in rear of Bonham's extreme left.
Major Walton's reserve battery of five guns was in position on McLean's farm
in a piece of woods in rear of Bee's right.
Hampton's Legion, of six companies of infantry, 600 strong, having arrived
that morning by the cars from Richmond, was subsequently, as soon as it
arrived, ordered forward to a position in the immediate vicinity of the
Lewis house as a support for any troops engaged in that quarter.
The effective force of all arms of the Army of the Potomac on that eventful
morning, including the garrison at Camp Pickens, did not exceed 21,833 and
29 guns. The Army of the Shenandoah, ready for action on the field, may be
set at 6,000 men and 20 guns. (That is, when the battle began. Smith's
brigade and Fisher's North Carolina came up later, and made total of Army of
the Shenandoah engaged, of all arms, 8,334. Hill's Virginia Regiment, 550,
also arrived, but was posted as reserve to right flank.) The brigade of
General Holmes mustered about 1,265 bayonets, 6 guns, and a company of
cavalry about 90 strong.
Informed at 5.30 a.m. by Colonel Evans that the enemy had deployed some
twelve hundred men (these were what Colonel Evans saw of General Schenck's
brigade of General Tyler's division and two other heavy brigades---in all
over nine thousand men and thirteen pieces of artillery, Carlisle's and
Ayres' batteries; that is, nine hundred men and two 6-pounders, confronted
by nine thousand men and thirteen pieces of artillery, mostly rifled) with
several pieces of artillery in his immediate front, I at once ordered him,
as also General Cooke, if attacked, to maintain their position to the last
extremity.
In my opinion the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a
rapid, determined attack with my right wing and center on the enemy's flank
and rear at Centreville, with due precautions against the advance of his
reserves from the direction of Washington. By such a movement I confidently
expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 m.
These new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully
approved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once
issued.
Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed
and supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham,
respectively, supported by their several appointed reserves. The cavalry,
under Stuart and Radford, were to be held in hand, subject to future orders
and ready for employment, as might be required by the exigencies of the
battle.
About 8.30 a.m. General Johnston and myself transferred our headquarters to
a central position, about half a mile in rear of Mitchell's Ford, whence we
might watch the course of events. Previously, as early as 5.30, the
Federalists in front of Evans' position (stone bridge) had opened with a
large 30-pounder Parrott rifled gun, and thirty minutes later with a
moderate, apparently tentative, fire from a battery of rifled pieces,
directed first in front of Evans', and then in the direction of Cocke's
position, but without drawing a return fire and discovery of our positions,
chiefly because in that quarter we had nothing but eight 6 pounder pieces,
which could not reach the distant enemy.
As the Federalists had advanced with an extended line of skirmishers in
front of Evans, that officer promptly threw forward the two flank companies
of the Fourth South Carolina Regiment and one company of Wheat's Louisiana
Battalion, deployed as skirmishers to cover his small front. An occasional
scattering fire resulted, and thus the two armies in that quarter remained
for more than an hour, while the main body of the enemy was marching his
devious way through the Big Forest to take our forces in flank and rear.
By 8.30 a.m. Colonel Evans, having become satisfied of the counterfeit
character of the movement on his front, and persuaded of an attempt to turn
his left flank, decided to change his position to meet the enemy, and for
this purpose immediately put in motion to his left and rear six companies of
Sloan's Fourth South Carolina Regiment, Wheat's Louisiana Battalion's five
companies, and two 6-pounders of Latham's battery, leaving four companies of
Sloan's regiment under cover as the sole immediate defense of the stone
bridge, but giving information to General Cocke of his change of position
and the red, sons that impelled it.
Following a road leading by the old Pittsylvania (Carter) mansion, Colonel
Evans formed in line of battle some four hundred yards in rear, as he
advanced, of that house, his guns to the front and in position, properly
supported, to its immediate right. Finding, however, that the enemy did not
appear on that road, which was a branch of one leading by Sudley Springs
Ford to Brentsville and Dumfries, he turned abruptly to the left, and
marching across the fields for three-quarters of a mile, about 9.30 a.m.
took a position in line of battle, his left, Sloan's companies, resting on
the main Brentsville road in a shallow ravine, the Louisiana Battalion to
the right, in advance some two hundred yards, a rectangular copse of wood
separating them, one piece of his artillery planted on an eminence some
seven hundred yards to the rear of Wheat's battalion, and the other on a
ridge near and in rear of Sloan's position, commanding a reach of the road
just in front of the line of battle. In this order he awaited the coming of
the masses of the enemy, now drawing near.
In the mean time, about 7 o'clock a.m., Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's
and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent to take up a position
along Bull Run, to guard the interval between Cooke's right and Bonham's
left, with orders to support either in case of need, the character and
topographical features of the ground having been shown to General Jackson by
Capt. D. B. Harris, of the engineers, of this army corps. So much of Bee's
and Bartow's brigades, now united, as had arrived, some 2,800 muskets, had
also been sent forward to the support of the position of the stone bridge.
The enemy, beginning his detour from the turnpike at a point nearly half-way
between stone bridge and Centreville, had pursued a tortuous, narrow trace
of a rarely-used road through a dense wood the greater part of his way until
near the Sudley road. A division under Colonel Hunter, of the Federal
Regular Army, of two strong brigades, was in the advance, followed
immediately by another division, under Colonel Heintzelman, of three
brigades and seven companies of Regular Cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of
artillery, eighteen of which were rifled guns. This column, as it crossed
Bull Run, numbered over sixteen thousand men of all arms by their own
accounts.
Burnside's brigade--which here, as at Fairfax Court-House, led the
advance--at about 9.45 a.m. debouched from a wood in sight of Evans'
position, some five hundred yards distant from Wheat's battalion. He
immediately threw forward his skirmishers in force, and they became engaged
with Wheat's command, and the 6-pounder gun under Lieutenant Leftwitch. The
Federalists at once advanced--as they report officially--the Second Rhode
Island Regiment Volunteers, with its vaunted battery of six 13-pounder
rifled guns. Sloan's companies were then brought into action, having been
pushed forward through the woods. The enemy, soon galled and staggered by
the fire and pressed by the determined valor with which Wheat handled his
battalion until he was desperately wounded, hastened up three other
regiments of the brigade and two Dahlgren howitzers, making in all quite
three thousand five hundred bayonets and eight pieces of artillery, opposed
to less than eight hundred men and two 6-pounder guns. Despite this odds,
this intrepid command, of but eleven weak companies, maintained its front to
the enemy for quite an hour, and until General Bee came to their aid with
his command. The heroic Bee, with a soldier's eye and recognition of the
situation, had previously disposed his command with skill, Imboden's battery
having been admirably placed between the two brigades, under shelter, behind
the undulations of a hill about one hundred and fifty yards north of the now
famous Henry house, and very near where he subsequently fell mortally
wounded, to the great misfortune of his country, but after deeds of
deliberate and ever-memorable courage. Meanwhile the enemy had pushed
forward a battalion of eight companies of regular infantry, and one of their
best batteries of six pieces (four rifled), supported by four companies of
marines, to increase the desperate odds against which Evans and his men had
maintained their stand with an almost matchless tenacity. General Bee, now
finding Evans sorely pressed under the crushing weight of the masses of the
enemy, at the call of Colonel Evans threw forward his whole force to his aid
across a small stream (Young's Branch and Valley), and engaged the
Federalists with impetuosity, Imboden's battery at the time playing from his
well-chosen position with brilliant effect with spherical case, the enemy
having first opened on him from a rifle battery (probably Griffin's) with
elongated cylindrical shells, which flew a few feet over the heads of our
men and exploded in the crest of the hill immediately in rear.
As Bee advanced under a severe fire he placed the Seventh and Eighth Georgia
Regiments under the chivalrous Bartow, at about 11 a.m.
in a wood of second-growth
pines, to the right and front of and nearly perpendicular to Evans line of
battle; the Fourth Alabama to the left of them, along a fence, connecting
the position of the Georgia regiments with the rectangular copse in which
Sloan's South Carolina companies were engaged? and into which he also threw
the Second Mississippi. A fierce and destructive conflict now ensued. The
fire was withering on both sides, while the enemy swept our short thin lines
with their numerous artillery, which, according to their official reports,
at this time consisted of at least ten rifled guns and four howitzers. For
an hour did these stout-hearted men of the blended commands of Bee, Evans,
and Barrow breast an unintermitting battle-storm, animated surely by
something more than the ordinary courage of even the bravest men under fire.
It must have been indeed the inspiration of the cause and consciousness of
the great stake at issue which thus nerved and animated one and all to stand
unawed and unshrinking in such extremity.
Two Federal brigades of Heintzelman's division were now brought into action,
led by Ricketts" superb light battery of six 10-pounder rifled guns, which,
posted on an eminence to the right of the Sudley road, opened fire on
Imboden's battery--about this time increased by two rifled pieces of the
Washington Artillery under Lieutenant Richardson, and already the mark of
two batteries, which divided their fire with Imboden and two guns under
Lieutenants Davidson and Leftwitch, of Latham's battery, posted as before
mentioned. At this time confronting the enemy we had still but Evans' eleven
companies and two guns, Bee's and Bartow's four regiments, the two companies
Eleventh Mississippi under Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, and the six pieces
under Imboden and Richardson. The enemy had two divisions of four strong
brigades, including seventeen companies of regular infantry, cavalry, and
artillery, four companies of marines, and twenty pieces of artillery. (See
official reports of Colonels Heintzelman, Porter, &c.) Against this odds,
scarcely credible, our advance position was still for a while maintained,
and the enemy's ranks constantly broken and shattered under the scorching
fire of our men; but fresh regiments of the Federalists came upon the field.
Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division, as is stated in their
reports, numbering over six thousand bayonets, which had found a passage
across the run about eight hundred yards above the stone bridge, threatened
our right.
Heavy losses bad now been sustained on our side both in numbers and in the
personal worth of the slain. The Eighth Georgia Regiment had suffered
heavily, being exposed, as it took and maintained its position, to a fire
from the enemy, already posted within a hundred yards of their front and
right, sheltered by fences and other cover. It was at this time that
Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner was severely wounded, as also several other
valuable officers. The adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Branch, was
killed, and the horse of the regretted Barrow was shot under him. The Fourth
Alabama also suffered severely from the deadly fire of the thousands of
muskets which they so dauntlessly confronted under the immediate leadership
of Bee himself. Its brave colonel (E. J. Jones) was dangerously wounded, and
many gallant officers fell, slain or hors de combat.
Now, however, with the surging mass of over fourteen thousand Federal
infantry pressing on their front and under the incessant fire of at least
twenty pieces of artillery, with the fresh brigades of Sherman and Keyes
approaching, the latter already in musket range, our lines gave back, but
under orders from General Bee. The enemy, maintaining their
fire, pressed their swelling
masses onward as our shattered battalions retired. The slaughter for the
moment was deplorable, and has filled many a Southern home with life-long
sorrow. Under this inexorable stress the retreat continued, until arrested
by the energy and resolution of General Bee, supported by Barrow and Evans,
just in rear of the Robinson house, and Hampton's Legion, which had been
already advanced and was in position near it. Imboden's battery, which had
been handled with marked skill, but whose men were almost exhausted, and the
two pieces of Walton's battery, under Lieutenant Richardson, being
threatened by the enemy's infantry on the left and front, were also obliged
to fall back. Imboden, leaving a disabled piece on the ground, retired until
he met Jackson's brigade, while Richardson joined the main body of his
battery near the Lewis house.
As our infantry retired from the extreme front the two 6-pounders of
Latham's battery before mentioned fell back with excellent judgment to
suitable positions in the rear, where an effective fire was maintained upon
the still advancing lines of the Federalists with damaging effect until
their ammunition was nearly exhausted, when they too were withdrawn in the
near presence of the enemy and rejoined their captain.
From the point, previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had
established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of musketry and
the sustained din of the artillery, which announced the serious outburst of
the battle on our left flank, and we anxiously but confidently awaited
similar sounds of conflict from our front at Centreville, resulting from the
prescribed attack in that quarter by our right wing.
At 10:30 a.m., however, this expectation was dissipated, from
Brigadier-General Ewell informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my
orders for his advance had miscarried, but that in consequence of a
communication from Gen. D. R. Jones he had just thrown his brigade across
the stream at Union Mills. But in my judgment it was now too late for the
effective execution of the contemplated movement, which must have required
quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack.
Therefore it became immediately necessary to depend on new combinations and
other dispositions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the
right and center, already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once
countermanded with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet
the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle.
Under these circumstances our reserves not already in movement were
immediately ordered up to support our left flank, namely, Holmes' two
regiments and battery of artillery, under Capt. Lindsey Walker, of six guns,
and Early's brigade. Two regiments from Bonham's brigade, with Kemper's four
6-pounders, were also called for and, with the sanction of General Johnston,
Generals Ewell, Jones (D. R.), Longstreet, and Bonham were directed to make
a demonstration to their several fronts, to retain and engross the enemy's
reserves and any forces on their flank and at and around Centreville.
Previously our respective chiefs of staff, Major Rhett and Colonel Jordan,
had been left at my headquarters to hasten up and give directions to any
troops that might arrive at Manassas.
These orders having been duly dispatched by staff officers, at 11.30 a.m.
General Johnston and myself set out for the immediate field of action, which
we reached in the rear of the Robinson and Widow Henry's houses at about 12
m., and just as the commands of Bee, Bar-tow, and Evans had taken shelter in
a wooded ravine behind the former, stoutly
held at the time by Hampton with his Legion, which had made stand there
after having previously been as far forward as the turnpike, where
Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, an officer of brilliant promise, was killed, and
other severe losses were sustained.
Before our arrival upon the scene General Jackson had moved forward with his
brigade of five Virginia regiments from his position in reserve, and had
judiciously taken post below the brim of the plateau, nearly east of the
Henry house, and to the left of the ravine and woods occupied by the mingled
remnants of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans' commands, with Imboden's battery and
two of Stanard's pieces placed so as to play upon the on-coming enemy,
supported in the immediate rear by Col. J. F. Preston's and
Lieutenant-Colonel Echols' regiments, on the right by Harper's, and on the
left by Allen's and Cummings' regiments.
As soon as General Johnston and myself reached the field we were occupied
with the reorganization of the heroic troops, whose previous stand, with
scarce a parallel, has nothing more valiant in all the pages of history, and
whose losses fitly tell why at length their ranks had lost their cohesion.
It was now that General Johnston impressively and gallantly charged to the
front, with the colors of the Fourth Alabama Regiment by his side, all the
field officers of the regiment having been previously disabled. Shortly
afterwards I placed S. R. Gist, adjutant and inspector general of South
Carolina, a volunteer aide of General Bee, in command of this regiment, and
who led it again to the front as became its previous behavior, and remained
with it for the rest of the day.
As soon as we had thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General
Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while he,
repairing to Portici, the Lewis house, should urge re-enforcement--forward.
At first he was unwilling, but reminded that one of us must do so, and that
properly it was his place, he reluctantly, but fortunately, complied;
fortunately, because from that position, by his energy and sagacity, his
keen perception and anticipation of my needs, he so directed the reserves as
to insure the success of the day.
As General Johnston departed for Portici, Colonel Bartow reported to me with
the remains of the Seventh Georgia Volunteers, Gartrell's, which I ordered
him to post on the left of Jackson's line in the edge of the belt of pines
bordering the southeastern rim of the plateau, on which the battle was now
to rage so long and so fiercely.
Col. William Smith's battalion of the Forty-ninth Virginia Volunteers,
having also come up by my orders, I placed it on the left of Gartrell's, as
my extreme left at the time. Repairing then to the right, I placed Hampton's
Legion, which have suffered greatly, on that flank somewhat to the rear of
Harper's regiment, and also the seven companies of the Eighth (Hunton's)
Virginia Regiment, which, detached from Cocke's brigade by my orders and
those of General Johnston, had opportunely reached the ground. These, with
Harper's regiment, constituted a reserve to protect our right flank from an
advance of the enemy from the quarter of the stone bridge, and served as a
support for the line of battle, which was formed on the right by Bee's and
Evans' commands, in the center by four regiments of Jackson's brigade, with
Imboden's four 6-pounders, Walton's five guns (two rifled), two guns (one
piece rifled) of Stanard's, and two 6-pounders of Rogers' batteries, the
latter under Lieutenant Heaton, and on the left by Gartrell's reduced ranks
and Colonel Smith's battalion, subsequently re-enforced, Falkner's Second
Mississippi Regiment, and by another regiment of the Army of the
Shenandoah, just arrived upon
the field--the Sixth (Fisher's) North Carolina. Confronting the enemy at
this time my forces numbered at most not more than sixty-five hundred
infantry and artillerists, with but thirteen pieces of artillery and two
companies (Carter's and Hoge's) of Stuart's Cavalry.
The enemy's force now bearing hotly and confidently down on our position,
regiment after regiment of the best-equipped men that ever took the field
according to their own official history of the day, was formed of Colonels
Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, Colonels Sherman's and Keyes' brigades
of Tyler's division, and of the formidable batteries of Ricketts, Griffin,
and Arnold (regulars), and Second Rhode Island and two Dahlgren howitzers--a
force of over twenty thousand infantry, seven companies of regular cavalry,
and twenty-four pieces of improved artillery. At the same time perilous
heavy reserves of infantry and artillery hung in the distance around the
stone bridge, Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and Union Mills Fords, visibly ready
to fall upon us at any moment, and I was also assured of the existence of
other heavy corps at and around Centreville and elsewhere within convenient
supporting distances.
Fully conscious of this portentous disparity of force, as I posted the lines
for the encounter I sought to infuse into the hearts of my officers and men
the confidence and determined spirit of resistance to this wicked invasion
of the homes of a free people which I felt. I informed them that
re-enforcements would rapidly come to their support, and that we must at all
hazards hold our posts until re-enforced. I reminded them that we fought for
our homes, our firesides, and for the independence of our country. I urged
them to the resolution of victory or death on that field. These sentiments
were loudly, eagerly cheered wheresoever proclaimed, and I then felt
reassured of the unconquerable spirit of that army, which would enable us to
wrench victory from the host then threatening us with destruction.
Oh, my country! I would readily have sacrificed my life and those of all the
brave men around me to save your honor and to maintain your independence
from the degrading yoke which those ruthless invaders had come to impose and
render perpetual, and the day's issue has assured me that such emotions must
also have animated all under my command.
In the mean time the enemy had seized upon the plateau on which Robinson's
and the Henry houses are situated--the position first occupied in the
morning by General Bee before advancing to the support of Evans. Ricketts'
battery of six rifled guns, the pride of the Federalists, the object of
their unstinted expenditure in outfit, and the equally powerful regular
light battery of Griffin, were brought forward and placed in immediate
action, after having, conjointly with the batteries already mentioned,
played from former positions with destructive effect upon our forward
battalions.
The topographical features of the plateau, now become the stage of the
contending armies, must be described in outline. A glance at the map will
show that it is inclosed on three sides by small water-courses, which empty
into Bull Run within a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of
the stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite one hundred feet above the
level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the level of
the inclosing streams in gentle slopes, but which are furrowed by ravines of
irregular direction and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young
pines and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique
to the course of Bull Run in
that quarter and to the Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each
other at right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses before
mentioned are small open fields of irregular outline, not exceeding one
hundred and fifty acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the time, the one
by the Widow Henry and the other by the free negro Robinson, are small
wooden buildings, the latter densely embowered in trees and environed by a
double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of
the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave excellent
shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it with the most
satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields, a broad belt of oaks
extends directly across the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which
during the battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the
mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view embraces a wide
expanse of woods and gently undulating open country of broad grass and grain
fields in all directions, including the scene of Evans' and Bee's recent
encounter with the enemy, some twelve hundred yards to the northward.
In reply to the play of the enemy's batteries our own artillery had not been
either idle or unskillful. The ground occupied by our guns, on a level with
that held by the batteries of the enemy, was an open space of limited
extent, behind a low undulation just at the eastern verge of the plateau,
some live or six hundred yards from the Henry house. Here, as before said,
thirteen pieces, mostly 6-pounders, were, maintained in action; the several
batteries of Imboden, Stanard, Pendleton (Rockbridge Artillery), and
Alburtis, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and five guns of Walton's and
Heaton's section of Rogers' battery of the Army of the Potomac, alternating
to some extent with each other, and taking part as needed, all from the
outset displaying that marvelous capacity of our people as artillerists
which has made them, it would appear, at once the terror and the admiration
of the enemy. As was soon apparent, the Federalists had suffered severely
from our artillery and from the fire of our musketry on the right, and
especially from the left flank, placed under cover, within whose galling
range they had been advanced; and we are told in their official reports how
regiment after regiment thrown forward to dislodge us was broken, never to
recover its entire organization on that field.
In the mean time, also, two companies of Stuart's Cavalry ((Carter's and
Hoge's) made a dashing charge down the Brentsville and Sudley road upon the
Fire Zouaves, then the enemy's right; on the plateau, which added to their
disorder wrought by our musketry on that flank. But still the press of the
enemy was heavy in that quarter of the field as fresh troops were thrown
forward there to outflank us, and some three guns of a battery in an attempt
to obtain a position, apparently to enfilade our batteries, were thrown so
close to the Thirty-third Regiment, Jackson's brigade, that that regiment,
springing forward, seized them, but with severe loss, and was subsequently
driven back by an overpowering force of Federal musketry.
Now, full 2 o'clock p.m., I gave the order for the right of my line, except
my reserves, to advance to recover the plateau. It was done with uncommon
resolution and vigor, and at the same time Jackson's brigade pierced the
enemy's center with the determination of veterans and the spirit of men who
fight for a sacred cause, but it suffered seriously. With equal spirit the
other parts of the line made the onset, and the Federal lines were broken
and swept back at all points from the open ground of the plateau. Rallying
soon, however, as they were strongly re-enforced
by fresh regiments, the Federalists returned, and by weight of numbers
pressed our lines back, recovered their ground and guns, and renewed the
offensive.
By this time, between half past two and 3 o'clock p.m., our re-enforcements
pushed forward, and, directed by General Johnston to the required quarter,
were at hand just as I had ordered forward to a second effort for the
recovery of the disputed plateau the whole line, including my reserve, which
at this crisis of the battle I felt called upon to lead in person. This
attack was general, and was shared in by every regiment then in the field,
including the Sixth (Fisher's) Worth Carolina Regiment, which had just come
up and taken position on the immediate left of the Forty-ninth Virginia
Regiment. The whole open ground was again swept clear of the enemy, and the
plateau around the Henry and Robinson houses remained finally in our
possession with the greater part of the Ricketts and Griffin batteries, and
a flag of the First Michigan Regiment, captured by the Twenty-seventh
Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols, of Jackson's brigade.
This part of the day was rich with deeds of individual coolness and
dauntless conduct, as well as well-directed embodied resolution and bravery,
but fraught with the loss to the service of the country of lives of
inestimable preciousness at this juncture. The brave Bee was mortally
wounded at the head of the Fourth Alabama and some Mississippians. In the
open field near the Henry house, and a few yards distant, the promising life
of Bartow, while leading the Seventh Georgia Regiment, was quenched in
blood. Col. F. J. Thomas, acting chief of ordnance, of General Johnston's
staff, after gallant conduct and most efficient service, was also slain.
Colonel Fisher, Sixth North Carolina, likewise fell, after soldierly
behavior at the head of his regiment with ranks greatly thinned.
Withers' Eighteenth Regiment, of Cocke's brigade, had come up in time to
follow this charge, and, in conjunction with Hampton's Legion, captured
several rifled pieces, which may have fallen previously in possession of
some of our troops, but if so, had been recovered by the enemy. These pieces
were immediately turned and effectively served on distant masses of the
enemy by the hands of some of our officers.
While the enemy had thus been driven back on our right entirely across the
turnpike and beyond Young's Branch on our left, the woods yet swarmed with
them when our re-enforcements opportunely arrived in quick succession and
took position in that portion of the field. Kershaw's Second and Cash's
Eighth South Carolina Regiments, which had arrived soon after Withers, were
led through the oaks just east of the Sudley-Brentsville road, brushing some
of the enemy before them, and taking an advantageous position along and west
of that road, opened with much skill and effect on bodies of the enemy that
had been rallied under cover of a strong Federal brigade posted on a plateau
in the southwest angle formed by intersection of the turnpike with the
Sudley-Brentsville road. Among the troops thus engaged were the Federal
regular infantry.
At the same time Kemper's battery, passing northward by the Sudley-Brentsville
road, took position on the open space, under orders of Colonel Kershaw, near
where an enemy's battery had been captured, and was opened with effective
results upon the Federal right, then the mark also of Kershaw's and Cash's
regiments. Preston's Twenty-eighth Regiment, of Cocke's brigade, had by that
time entered the same body of oaks, and encountered some Michigan troops,
capturing their brigade commander, Colonel Willcox.
Another important accession to our forces had also occurred about the same
time, 3 o'clock p.m. Brig. Gen. E. K. Smith, with some seventeen hundred
infantry, of Elzey's brigade, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and Beckham's
battery came upon the field from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had
arrived by railroad at noon. Directed in person by General Johnston to the
left, then so much endangered, on reaching a position in rear of the oak
woods, south of the Henry house, and immediately east of the Sudley road,
General Smith was disabled by a severe wound, and his valuable services were
lost at that critical juncture; but the command devolved upon a meritorious
officer of experience, Colonel Elzey, who led his infantry at once somewhat
farther to the left, in the direction of the Chinn house, across the road,
through the oaks skirting the west side of the road, and around which he
sent the battery, under Lieutenant Beckham. This officer took up a most
favorable position near that house, whence, with a clear view of the Federal
right and center, filling the open fields to the west of the Brentsville-Sudley
road and gently sloping southward, he opened fire with his battery upon them
with deadly and damaging effect.
Colonel Early, who by some mischance did not receive orders until 2 o'clock
which had been sent him at noon, came on the ground immediately after Elzey,
with Kemper's Seventh Virginia, Hays' Seventh Louisiana, and Barksdale's
Thirteenth Mississippi Regiments. This brigade, by the personal direction of
General Johnston, was marched by the Holkham house across the fields to the
left, entirely around the woods through which Elzey had passed, and under a
severe fire, into a position in line of battle near Chinn's house,
outflanking the enemy's right.
At this time, about 3.30 p, m., the enemy, driven back on their left and
center and brushed from the woods bordering the Sudley road, south and west
of the Henry house, had formed a line of battle of truly formidable
proportions, of crescent outline, reaching on their left from vicinity of
Pittsylvania (the old Carter mansion), by Mathews' and in rear of Dogan's,
across the turnpike near to Chinn's house. The woods and fields were filled
with their masses of infantry a and their carefully-preserved cavalry. It
was a truly magnificent, though redoubtable, spectacle as they threw forward
in flue style on the broad, gentle slopes of the ridge occupied by their
main lines a cloud of skirmishers, preparatory for another attack.
But as Early formed his line, and Beckham's pieces played upon the right of
the enemy, Elzey's brigade, Gibbons' Tenth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel
Steuart's First Maryland, and Vaughn's Third Tennessee Regiments, Cash's
Eighth and Kershaw's Second South Carolina, Withers, Eighteenth and
Preston's Twenty-eighth Virginia advanced in an irregular line, almost
simultaneously, with great spirit from their several positions upon the
front and flanks of the enemy in their quarter of the field. At the same
time, too, Early resolutely assailed their right flank and rear. Under this
combined attack the enemy was soon forced first over the narrow plateau in
the southern angle made by the two roads so often mentioned into a patch of
woods on its western slope, thence back over Young's Branch and the turnpike
into the fields of the Dogan farm and rearward, in extreme disorder in all
available directions towards Bull Run. The rout had now become general and
complete.
About the time that Elzey and Early were entering into action a column of
the enemy (Keyes' brigade, of Tyler's division) made its way across the
turnpike between Bull Run and the Robinson house, under cover of a wood and
brow of the ridges, apparently to turn my right, but was easily repulsed by
a few shots from Latham's battery, now united and placed in position by
Capt. D. B. Harris, of the Virginia engineers, whose services during the day
became his character as an able, cool, an(. skillful officer, and from
Alburtis' battery, opportunely ordered by General Jackson to a position to
the right of Latham, on a hill commanding the line of approach of the enemy,
and supported by portions of regiments collected together by the staff
officers of General Johnston and myself.
Early's brigade, meanwhile, joined by the Nineteenth Virginia Regiment,
Lieutenant-Colonel Strange, of Cockers brigade, pursued the now
panic-stricken fugitive enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry and Beckham had also
taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy had come upon the
field that morning, but soon, cumbered by prisoners who thronged his way,
the former was unable to attack the mass of the fast-fleeing, frantic
Federalists. Withers', R. T. Preston's, Cash's, and Kershaw's regiments,
Hampton's Legion, and Kemper's battery also pursued along the Warrenton road
by the stone bridge, the enemy having opportunely opened a way for them
through the heavy abatis which my troops had made on the west side of the
bridge several days before; but this pursuit was soon recalled in
consequence of a false report which unfortunately reached us that the
enemy's reserves, known to be fresh and of considerable strength, were
threatening the position of Union Mills Ford.
Colonel Radford, with six companies Virginia Cavalry, was also ordered by
General Johnston to cross Bull Run and attack the enemy from the direction
of Lewis' house. Conducted by one of my aides, Colonel Chisolm, by the Lewis
Ford to the immediate vicinity of the suspension bridge, he charged a
battery with great gallantry, took Colonel Corcoran, of the Sixty-ninth
Regiment New York Volunteers, a prisoner, and captured the Federal colors of
that regiment, as well as a number of the enemy. He lost, however, a
promising officer of his regiment, Capt. Winston Radford.
Lieutenant-Colonel Mumford also led some companies of cavalry in hot
pursuit, and rendered material service in the capture of prisoners and of
cannon, horses, ammunition, &c., abandoned by the enemy in their flight.
Captain Lay's company of the Powhatan Troops and Utterback's Rangers,
Virginia Volunteers, attached to my person, did material service under
Captain Lay in rallying troops broken for the time by the onset of the
enemy's masses.
During the period of the momentous events, fraught with the weal of our
country, which were passing on the blood-stained plateau along the Sudley
and Warrenton roads, other portions of the line of Bull Run had not been
void of action of moment and of influence on the general result.
While Colonel Evans and his sturdy band were holding at bay the Federal
advance beyond the turnpike the enemy made repeated demonstrations with
artillery and infantry upon the line of Cooke's brigade, with the serious
intention of forcing the position, as General Schenck admits in his report.
They were driven back with severe loss by Latham's (a section)and Rogers'
four 6-pounders, and were so impressed with the strength of that line as to
be held in check and inactive even after it had been stripped of all its
troops but one company of the Nineteenth Virginia Regiment, under Captain
Duke, a meritorious officer; and it is worthy of notice that in this
encounter of our 6-pounder guns, handled by our volunteer artillerists, they
had worsted such a notorious adversary as the Ayres (formerly Sherman's)
battery, which quit the contest
under the illusion that it had weightier metal than its own to contend with.
The center brigades, Bonham's and Longstreet's, of the line of Bull Run, if
not closely engaged, were, nevertheless, exposed for much of the day to an
annoying, almost incessant fire of artillery of long range; but, by a
steady, veteran-like maintenance of their positions, they held virtually
paralyzed all day two strong brigades of the enemy with their batteries
(four) of rifled guns.
As before said, two regiments of Bonham's brigade--Second and Eighth South
Carolina Volunteers-and Kemper's battery took a distinguished part in the
battle. The remainder--Third (Williams'), Seventh (Bacon's) South Carolina
Volunteers, Eleventh (Kirkland's) North Carolina Regiment, six companies of
the Eighth Louisiana Volunteers, Shields' battery, and one Section of
Walton's battery, under Lieutenant Garnett--whether in holding their post or
taking up the pursuit, officers and men discharged their duty with credit
and promise.
Longstreet's brigade, pursuant to orders prescribing his part of the
operations of the center and right wing, was thrown across Bull Run early in
the morning, and under a severe fire of artillery was skillfully disposed
for the assault of the enemy's batteries in that quarter, but was withdrawn
subsequently, in consequence of the change of plan already mentioned and
explained. The troops of this brigade were--First (Major Skinner), Eleventh
(Garland's), Twenty-fourth (Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston), Seventeenth (Corse's)
Virginia Regiments; Fifth North Carolina (Lieutenant-Colonel Jones), and
Whitehead's company Virginia Cavalry. Throughout the day these troops
evinced the most soldierly spirit.
After the rout, having been ordered by General Johnston in the direction of
Centreville in pursuit, these brigades advanced nearly to that place, when,
night and darkness intervening, General Bonham thought it proper to direct
his own brigade and that of General Longstreet back to Bull Run.
General D. R. Jones early in the day crossing Bull Run with his brigade,
pursuant to orders indicating his part in the projected attack by our right
wing and center on the enemy at Centreville, took up a position on the Union
Hills and Centreville road more than a mile in advance of the run. Ordered
back, in consequence of the miscarriage of the orders to General Ewell, the
retrograde movement was necessarily made under a sharp fire of artillery.
At noon this brigade, in obedience to new instructions, was again thrown
across Bull Run to make demonstration. Unsupported by other troops, the
advance was gallantly made until within musket range of the enemy's
force--Colonel Davies' brigade, in position near Rocky Run--and under the
concentrated fire of their artillery. In this affair the Fifth, (Jenkins')
South Carolina and Captain Fontaine's company of the Eighteenth Mississippi
Regiment are mentioned by General Jones as having shown conspicuous
gallantry, coolness, and discipline under a combined fire of infantry and
artillery. Not only did the return fire of the brigade drive to cover the
enemy's infantry, but the movement unquestionably spread through the enemy's
ranks a sense of insecurity and danger from an attack by that route on their
rear at Centreville, which served to augment the extraordinary panic which
we know disbanded the entire Federal Army for the time. This is evident from
the fact that Colonel Davies, the immediate adversary's commander, in his
official report, was induced to magnify one small company of our cavalry
which accompanied the brigade into a force of 2,000 men, and Colonel
Miles, the commander of the
Federal reserves at Centreville, says the movement caused painful
apprehensions for the left flank of their army.
General Ewell, occupying for the time the right of the lines of Bull Run, at
Union Mills Ford, after the miscarriage of my orders for his advance upon
Centreville, in the afternoon was ordered by General Johnston to bring up
his brigade into battle, then raging on the left flank. Promptly executed as
this movement was, the brigade, after a severe march, reached the field too
late to share the glories as they had the labors of the day. As the
important position at the Union Mills had been left with but a slender
guard, General Ewell was at once ordered to retrace his steps and resume his
position,. to prevent the possibility of its seizure by any force of the
enemy in that quarter. Brigadier-General Holmes, left with his brigade as a
support to the same position in the original plan of battle, had also been
called to the left, whither he marched with the utmost speed, but not in
time to join actively in the battle. Walker's rifled guns of the brigade,
however, came up in time to be fired with precision and decided execution at
the retreating enemy, and Scotts cavalry, joining in the pursuit, assisted
in the capture of prisoners and war munitions.
This victory, the details of which I have thus sought to chronicle as fully
as were fitting an official report, it remains to record was dearly won by
the death of many officers and men of inestimable value, belonging to all
grades of our society. In the death of General Barnard E. Bee the
Confederacy has sustained an irreparable loss, for, with great personal
bravery and coolness, he possessed the qualities of an accomplished soldier
and an able, reliable commander. Colonels Bartow and Fisher and
Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, of Hampton's Legion, in the fearless command of
their men, gave earnest of great usefulness to the service had they been
spared to complete a career so brilliantly begun. Besides the field officers
already mentioned as having been wounded while in the gallant discharge of
their duties, many others also received severe wounds, after equally
honorable and distinguished conduct, whether in leading their men forward or
in rallying them when overpowered or temporarily shattered by the largely
superior force to which we were generally opposed.
The subordinate grades were likewise abundantly conspicuous for zeal and
capacity for the leadership of men in arms. To mention all who, fighting
well, paid the lavish forfeit of their lives, or at least crippled,
mutilated bodies, on the field of Manassas, cannot well be done within the
compass of this paper; but a grateful country and mourning friends will not
suffer their names and services to be forgotten and pass away unhonored.
Nor are those officers and men who were so fortunate as to escape the
thick-flying deadly missiles of the enemy less worthy of praise for their
endurance, firmness, and valor, than their brothers in arms whose lives were
closed or bodies maimed on that memorable day. To mention all who exhibited
ability and brilliant courage were impossible in this report; nor do the
reports of brigade and other subordinate commanders supply full lists of all
actually deserving of distinction. I can only mention those whose conduct
came immediately under my notice or the consequence of whose actions
happened to be signally important. It is fit that I should in this way
commend to notice the dauntless conduct and imperturbable coolness of
Colonel Evans, and well indeed was he supported by Colonel Sloan and the
officers of the Fourth South Carolina Regiment, as also Major Wheat, than
whom no one displayed more brilliant courage until carried from the field
shot through the lungs, though
happily not mortally stricken. But in the desperate, unequal conflict to
which these brave gentlemen were for a time necessarily exposed, the
behavior of officers and men generally was worthy of the highest admiration,
and assuredly hereafter all there present may proudly say, We were of that
band who fought the first hour of the battle of Manassas. Equal honors and
credit must also be awarded in the pages of history to the gallant officers
and men who, under Bee and Bartow, subsequently marching to their side,
saved them from destruction, and relieved them from the brunt of the enemy's
attack.
The conduct of General Jackson also requires mention as eminently that of an
able, fearless soldier and sagacious commander, one fit to lead his
efficient brigade. His prompt, timely arrival before the plateau of the
Henry house, and his judicious disposition of his troops, contributed much
to the success of the day. Although painfully wounded in the hand, he
remained on the field to the end of the battle, rendering invaluable
assistance.
Col. William Smith was as efficient as self-possessed and brave. The
influence of his example and his words of encouragement were not confined to
his immediate command, the good conduct of which is especially noticeable,
inasmuch as it had been embodied but a day or two before the battle.
Colonels Harper, Hunton, and Hampton, commanding regiments of the
reserve, attracted my notice by their soldierly ability, as with their
gallant commands they restored the fortunes of the day at a time when
the enemy by a last desperate onset with heavy odds had driven our forces
from the fiercely-contested ground around the Henry and Robinson houses.
Veterans could not have behaved better than these well-led regiments.
High praise must also be given to Colonels Cocke, Early, and Elzey, brigade
commanders; also to Colonel Kershaw, commanding for the time the Second and
Eighth South Carolina Regiments. Under the instructions of General Johnston
these officers reached the field at an opportune, critical moment, and
disposed, handled, and fought their respective commands with sagacity,
decision, and successful results, which have been described in detail.
Col. J. E. B. Stuart likewise deserves mention for his enterprise and
ability as a cavalry commander. Through his judicious reconnaissance of the
country on our left flank he acquired information, both of topographical
features and the positions of the enemy, of the utmost importance in the
subsequent and closing movements of the day on that flank, and his services
in the pursuit were highly effective.
Capt. E. P. Alexander, C. S. Engineers, gave me seasonable and material
assistance early in the day with his system of signals. Almost the first
shot fired by the enemy passed through the tent of his party at the stone
bridge, where they subsequently firmly maintained their position in the
discharge of their duty--the transmission of messages of the enemy's
movements--for several hours under fire. Later, Captain Alexander acted as
my aide-de-camp in the transmission of orders and in observation of the
enemy.
I was most efficiently served throughout the day by my volunteer aides,
Colonels Preston, Manning, Chesnut, Miles, Rice, Hayward, and Chisolm, to
whom I tender my thanks for their unflagging, intelligent, and fearless
discharge of the laborious, responsible duties Intrusted to them. To Lieut.
S. W. Ferguson, aide-de-camp, and Colonel Hayward, who were habitually at my
side from 12 noon until the close of the battle, my special acknowledgments
are due. The horse of the former was killed under him by the same
shell that wounded that of the latter. Both were eminently useful to me, and
were distinguished for coolness and courage until the enemy gave way and
fled in wild disorder in every direction--a scene the President of the
Confederacy had the high satisfaction of witnessing, as he arrived upon the
field at that exultant moment.
I also received from the time I reached the front such signal service from
H. E. Peyton, at the time a private in the Loudoun Cavalry, that I have
called him to my personal staff. Similar services were also rendered me
repeatedly during the battle by T. J. Randolph, a volunteer acting
aide-de-camp to Colonel Cocke. Capt. Clifton H. Smith, of the general staff,
was also present on the field, and rendered efficient service in the
transmission of orders.
It must be permitted me here to record my profound sense of my obligations
to General Johnston for his generous permission to carry out my plans with
such modifications as circumstances had required. From his services on the
field as we entered it together, already mentioned, and his subsequent
watchful management of the re-enforcements as they reached the vicinity of
the field, our countrymen may draw the most auspicious auguries.
To Col. Thomas Jordan, my efficient and zealous assistant adjutant-general,
much credit is due for his able assistance in the organization of the forces
under my command and for the intelligence and promptness with which he has
discharged all the laborious and important duties of his office.
Valuable assistance was given to me by Major Cabell, chief officer of the
quartermaster's department, in the sphere of his duties-duties environed by
far more than the ordinary difficulties and embarrassments attending the
operations of a long organized regular establishment.
Col. R. B. Lee, chief of subsistence department, had but just entered upon
his duties, but his experience and long and varied services in his
department made him as efficient as possible.
Capt. W. H. Fowle, whom Colonel Lee had relieved, had previously exerted
himself to the utmost to carry out orders from these headquarters to render
his department equal to the demands of the service. That it was not entirely
so it is due to justice to say was certainly not his fault.
Deprived by the sudden severe illness of the medical director, Surg. Thomas
H. Williams, his duties were discharged by Surg. R. L. Brodie to my entire
satisfaction; and it is proper to say that the entire medical corps of the
Army at present, embracing gentlemen of distinction in the profession, who
had quit lucrative private practice, by their services in the field and
subsequently did high honor to their profession.
The vital duties of the ordnance department were effectively discharged
under the administration of my chief of artillery and ordnance, Col. S.
Jones.
At one time, when reports of evil omen and disaster reached Camp Pickens
with such circumstantiality as to give reasonable grounds of anxiety, its
commander, Colonel Terrett, the commander of the intrenched batteries,
Captain Sterrett, of the C. S. Navy, and their officers, made the most
efficient possible preparations for the desperate defense of that position
in extremity; and in this connection I regret my inability to mention the
names of those patriotic gentlemen of Virginia by the gratuitous labor of
whose slaves the intrenched camp at Manassas had been mainly constructed,
relieving the troops from that laborious service, and giving opportunity for
their military instruction.
Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Williamson, the engineer of these works, assisted by
Capt. D. B. Harris, discharged his duties with untiring energy and devotion
as well as satisfactory skill.
Capt. W. H. Stevens, engineer C. S. Army, served with the advanced forces at
Fairfax Court-House for some time before the battle. He laid out the works
there in admirable accordance with the purposes for which they were
designed, and yet so as to admit of ultimate extension and adaptation to
more serious uses as means and part of a system of real defense when
determined upon. He has shown himself to be an officer of energy and
ability.
Maj. Thomas G. Rhett, after having discharged for several months the
laborious duties of adjutant-general to the commanding officer of Camp
Pickens, was detached to join the Army of the Shenandoah just on the eve of
the advance of the enemy, but volunteering his services, was ordered to
assist on the staff of General Bonham, joining that officer at Centreville
on the night of the 17th, before the battle of Bull Run, where he rendered
valuable services, until the arrival of General Johnston, on the 20th of
July, when he was called to the place of chief of staff of that officer. It
is also proper to acknowledge the signal services rendered by Cols. B. F.
Terry and T. Lubbock, of Texas, who had attached themselves to the staff of
General Longstreet. These gentlemen made daring and valuable reconnaissances
of the enemy's positions, assisted by Captains Goree and Chichester; they
also carried orders to the field, and on the following day accompanied
Captain White-, head's troop to take possession of Fairfax Court-House.
Colonel Terry, with his unerring rifle, severed the halliard, and thus
lowered the Federal flag found still floating from the cupola of the
court-house there. He also secured a large Federal garrison flag, designed,
it is said, to be unfurled over our intrenchments at Manassas.
In connection with the unfortunate casualty of the day, that is the
miscarriage of the orders sent by courier to Generals Holmes and Ewell to
attack the enemy in flank and reverse at Centreville, through which the
triumph of our arms was prevented from being still more decisive, I regard
it in place to say a divisional organization, with officers in command of
divisions, with appropriate rank, as in European services, would greatly
reduce the risk of such mishaps, and would advantageously simplify the
communications of a general in command of a field with his troops.
While glorious for our people, and of crushing effect upon the morale
of our hitherto confident and overweening adversary, as were the events of
the battle of Manassas, the field was only won by stout fighting, and, as
before reported, with much loss, as is precisely exhibited in the papers
herewith, marked F, G, and H,(*) and being lists of the killed and
wounded. The killed outright numbered 369, the wounded 1,483, making an
aggregate of 1,852.
The actual loss of the enemy will never be known; it may now only be
conjectured. Their abandoned dead, as they were buried by our people where
they fell, unfortunately were not enumerated, but many parts of the field
were thick with their corpses as but few battle-fields have ever been. The
official reports of the enemy are studiously silent on this point, but still
afford us data for an approximate estimate. Left almost in the dark in
respect to the losses of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, first,
longest, and most hotly engaged, we are informed that Sherman's brigade,
Tyler's division, suffered in killed, wounded, and missing 609; that is,
about eighteen per cent. of the brigade. A regiment of Franklin's brigade
(Gorman's) lost twenty-one per cent., Griffin's (battery) loss was thirty
per cent., and that of Keyes' brigade, which was so handled by its commander
as to be exposed to only occasional volleys from our troops, was at least
ten per cent. To these facts add the repeated references in the reports of
the more reticent commanders to the "murderous" fire to which they were
habitually exposed, the "pistol-range" volleys, and galling musketry of
which they speak as scourging their ranks, and we are warranted in placing
the entire loss of the Federalists at over forty-five hundred in killed,
wounded, and prisoners. To this may be legitimately added as a casualty of
the battle the thousands of fugitives from the field, who have never
rejoined their regiments, and who are as much lost the enemy's service as if
slain or disabled by wounds. These may not be included under the head of
missing, because in every instance of such report we took as many prisoners
of those brigades or regiments as are reported missing.
A list appended exhibits some 1,460 of their wounded and others who fell
into our hands and were sent to Richmond.(*) Some were sent to other
points, so that the number of prisoners, including wounded who did not die,
may be set down as not less than 1,600. Besides these a considerable number
who could not be removed from the field died at several farm-houses and
field hospitals within ten days following the battle.
To serve the future historian of this war I will note the fact that among
the captured Federalists are officers and men of forty-seven regiments of
volunteers, besides from some nine different regiments of regular troops,
detachments of which were engaged. From their official reports we learn of a
regiment of volunteers engaged, six regiments of Miles' division, and the
five regiments of Runyon's brigade, from which we have neither sound nor
wounded prisoners. Making all allowances for mistakes, we are warranted in
saying that the Federal army consisted of at least fifty-five regiments of
volunteers, eight companies of regular infantry, four of marines, nine of
regular cavalry, and twelve batteries of forty-nine guns. These regiments at
one time, as will appear from a published list appended, marked K, numbered
in the aggregate 54,140, and average 964 each. From an order of the enemy's
commander, however, date, July 13, we learn that one hundred men front each
regiment were directed to remain in charge of their respective camps. Some
allowance must further be made for the sick and details, which would reduce
the average to eight hundred men. Adding the regular cavalry, infantry, and
artillery present, an estimate of their force may be made.(+)
A paper appended, marked L, exhibits in part the ordnance and supplies
captured, including some twenty-eight field pieces of the best character of
arm, with over one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, thirty-seven
caissons, six forges, four battery wagons, sixty-four artillery horses
completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 4,500 sets of
accouterments, over 500 muskets, some nine regimental and garrison flags,
with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a
large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp
and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence.
Added to these results may rightly be noticed here that by this battle an
invading army, superbly equipped, within twenty miles of their base of
operations, has been converted into one virtually besieged and
exclusively occupied for months
in the construction of a stupendous series of fortifications for the
protection of its own capital.
I beg to call attention to the reports of the several subordinate commanders
for reference to the signal parts played by individuals of their respective
commands. Contradictory statements found in these reports should not excite
surprise, when we remember how difficult if not impossible it is to
reconcile the narrations of bystanders or participants in even the most
inconsiderable affair, much less the shifting, thrilling scenes of a
battlefield.
Accompanying are maps showing the positions of the armies on the morning of
the 21st July and of three several stages of the battle; also of the line of
Bull Run north of Blackburn's Ford. These maps, from actual surveys made by
Capt. D. B. Harris, assisted by Mr. John Grant, were drawn by the latter
with a rare accuracy worthy of high commendation.(*)
In conclusion, it is proper and doubtless expected that through this report
my countrymen should be made acquainted with some of the sufficient causes
that prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged vigorous pursuit of
the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. The War Department has been fully
advised long since of all of those causes, some of which only are proper to
be here communicated. An army which had fought as ours on that day, against
uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without
food except a hastily-snatched scanty meal at dawn, was not in condition for
the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the
battle.
On the following day an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain
intervened to obstruct our advance with reasonable prospect of fruitful
results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers
made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, Commanding.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.
[Indorsement.]
The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was not, as
herein reported, to form a junction, "should the movement in his judgment be
deemed advisable." The following is an accurate copy of the order:
General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a
junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable,
make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court-House,
either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your
discretion.
The words "if practicable" had reference to letters of General Johnston of
12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power
to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of
Patterson's forces as compared with his own.
The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not accepted, and
to have led to a decision of the War Department, cannot be found among its
files, nor any reference to any decision made upon it, and it was not known
that the Army had advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position
previously selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have continued
to be the defensive line occupied by the main
body of our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message to be
verbally delivered was sent by Hon. Mr. Chesnut. If the conjectures recited
in the report were entertained, they rested on the accomplishment of one
great condition, namely, that a junction of the forces of Generals Johnston
and Holmes should be made with the army of General Beauregard, and should
gain a victory. The junction was made, the victory was won, but the
consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why no such
consequences could result are given in the closing passages of the reports
of both the commanding generals, and the responsibility cannot be
transferred to the Government at Richmond, which certainly would have united
in any feasible plan to accomplish such desirable results.
If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been presented in a
written communication, and in sufficient detail to permit proper
investigation, it must have been pronounced to be impossible at that time,
and its proposal could only have been accounted for by the want of
information of the forces and positions of the armies in the field. The
facts that rendered it impossible are the following:
1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chestnut, on the
supposition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand men from the
command of General Johnston. The letters of General Johnston show his
effective force to have been only eleven thousand, with an enemy thirty
thousand strong in his front ready to take possession of the valley of
Virginia on his withdrawal.
2. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction of a part of
the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett in Western Virginia.
General Garnett's forces amounted only to three or four thousand men, then
known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan,
and the news that he was himself killed, and his army scattered, arrived
within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnuts arrival in Richmond.
3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that
the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces
could effect junctions to attack them in detail.
4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battlefield
would enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac,
garrisoned, and within supporting distance of fresh troops; nor after the
actual battle and victory did the generals on the field propose an advance
on the capital, nor does it appear that they have since believed themselves
in a condition to attempt such a movement.
It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on file in the
War Department as recited at the close of the report, showing what were the
causes which "prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged vigorous
pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac."
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS ARMY POTOMAC,
Centreville, Va., November 8, 1861.
GENERAL: My attention having been called to the date of my report of the
battle of Manasses, August 26, 1861, when it was only received at the War
Department October 15, 1861, I have to request that the date of the letter
accompanying the report, October --, 1861, should be affixed to it. The
delay arose from the fact that it was placed in the hands of the copyist on
the day of its date, but was left open to be amended and corrected as the
details of the battle became better known and
developed, by discussion on the subject and the reports of the enemy then
being published, which enabled me to furnish, not only the report, but the
history of that battle, accompanied by a full set of drawings, showing the
position of the contending forces during four periods of that grand drama.
I am led to infer also that the strategic portion of the report is an
obstacle to its publication. Should that be the case, I have to request that
it may be separated into two parts, to obviate the difficulty referred to;
but I do not wish it understood, however, that I ask the publication of any
part of it, leaving that entirely to the judgment of the War Department.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G.T. BEAUREGARD,
General, Commanding.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant-General, C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
P. S.--What can be the matter with the mails? My letters are often from five
to six days getting here from Richmond.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 16, 1861.
Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
SIR: In obedience to your order, I proceeded on Sunday last, 14th instant,
to Richmond, with the purpose of laying before the President for his
consideration your views and plans for the combined operation of the two
armies under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston and yourself,
respectively. I arrived in Richmond at 3.30 on the same day I left your
quarters, and without delay reported to the President, who, although sick in
bed, received me with great kindness and cordiality. After stating to him
the object of my visit, he appointed an hour to meet him with General R. E.
Lee, and Adjutant and Inspector General Cooper. At the appointed time the
President, Generals Lee and Cooper, and Colonel Preston, of your staff, met
me in private conference. Being requested by the President to lay before
those present the subject-matter with which I was charged, I submitted on
your part the following propositions:
That the Confederate armies were in front of the enemy with greatly inferior
forces at all points; that it was desirable by uniting a portion of our
forces to outnumber the enemy at some important point; that the point now
occupied by you was at present in reference to the armies considered the
most important. I stated also that the enemy were at present at or near
Falls Church, with eight or ten thousand men, on the Alexandria, Loudoun and
Hampshire Railroad, and also with some portion of his force at Springfield,
on the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, with every indication of a purpose to
advance on both lines, and that it was most probable the enemy would
threaten our camp at Manassas with about ten thousand men, while the main
body, twenty thousand or more, would advance towards Vienna, Frying Pan, and
Pleasant Valley, to Hay Market,, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, view to cut
off our communication with General Johnston. To accomplish this, possession
would be taken of passes of the Blue Ridge at Manassas, Ashby's, and
Snicker's Gaps. He would then endeavor to cut off your communication with
Richmond by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad,
and force you either to fight in open field with greatly inferior numbers or
to retire towards Fredericksburg by way of Brentsville, to join forces with
General Holmes, or to withdraw from the intrenched camp and retire by the
Alexandria and Orange Railroad before the enemy could reach it.
Under these circumstances I stated you would propose, and did propose, that
General Johnston should, with the bulk of his forces, say twenty thousand,
unite with you, leaving from three to five thousand men to guard the passes
of the Blue Ridge and to hold Patterson in cheek. Then, with the combined
forces of General Johnston and yourself, you would move rapidly forward on
Fairfax Court-House, establish yourself between the two lines of the enemy,
attack them separately with larger masses, and thus exterminate them or
drive them into the Potomac. This being done, General Johnston, with ten
thousand of your forces in addition to his own, and rallying as he went
those left to guard the passes, would return at once with superior numbers,
say thirty-five thousand, to attack and destroy Patterson at Winchester or
wherever he might be. One week from the time of leaving Winchester would be
sufficient to accomplish all this. You would then either occupy the enemy's
works in front of Washington if he should abandon them, or fall back on your
present positions, according to circumstances. General Johnston, having
disposed of Patterson, would detach a sufficient number from his force to
re-enforce Garnett and make him superior to General McClellan. Having
defeated McClellan,. General Garnett could then unite with Johnston, and the
two cross the Potomac at the nearest point for Maryland, and, arousing the
people as they proceeded, march to the rear of Washington, while you would
attack it in front.
To these propositions respectful and earnest consideration was given by the
President and the two generals I have mentioned. The scheme was considered
brilliant and comprehensive, but to its adoption at this time two leading
objections were urged by the President and by General Lee One was that
General Johnston's force was not now sufficiently strong to allow of the
withdrawal of numbers sufficient to effect your object, and at the same time
leave enough to keep Patterson in check and keep him from coming down upon
your left. And the other and main objection was that the enemy was as yet
too close to their cover to allow the reasonable expectation of the
accomplishment of your object; that they would immediately fall back upon
their intrenchments, or, being so close to their large reserves, would be
quickly re-en-forced in numbers sufficient to regain the superiority of
numbers, and thus defeat your purpose; that the combination might be made at
a later period, when the objection would be removed by a sufficient increase
of your armies and by the lengthening of the enemy's lines and increase of
distance from cover and reserves for quick re-enforcement.
Respectfully submitted.
JAMES CHESNUT, JR.
-----
RICHMOND, VA., August 4, 1861.
General G. T. BEAUREGARD:
MY DEAR SIR: Inclosed I transmit copies of a resolution of inquiry
and the reply to it. You will perceive that the answer was made in view of
the telegram which I inclose to you, that being the only information then
before me. Since that time it has been communicated to
me that your letter to the Hon.
Mr. Miles, on the wants of your army and the consequences thereof, was read
to the Congress, and hence the inquiry instituted. Permit me to request that
you will return the telegram to me, which I inclosed to show you the form in
which the matter came before me. Some excitement has been created by your
letters. The quartermaster and the commissary generals both feel that they
have been unjustly arraigned. As for myself, I can only say that I have
endeavored to anticipate wants, and any failure which has occurred from
imperfect knowledge might have been best avoided by timely requisitions and
estimates. I think you are unjust to yourself in putting your failure to
pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of short supplies of
subsistence and transportation. Under the circumstances of our Army, and in
the absence of the knowledge since acquired--if, indeed, the statements be
true--it would have been extremely hazardous to have done more than was
performed. You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the
enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you in the night
of the 21st to repel a supposed attack upon our right, and the next day's
operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's
panic. Enough was done for glory, and the measure of duty was full. Let us
rather show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable than, by
dwelling on possibilities, recently developed, give form and substance to
the criticisms, always easy to those who judge after the event.
With sincere esteem, I am your friend,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
RICHMOND, VA., October 30, 1861.
General G. T. BEAUREGARD:
SIR: Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper publications,
purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to be a synopsis of your
report of the battle of July 21 last, and in which it is represented that
you had been overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south
of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and the
liberation of Maryland. I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has
to-day been submitted to my inspection. It appears, by official indorsement,
to have been received by the Adjutant General on October 15, though it is
dated August 26, 1861. With much surprise I found that the newspaper
statements were sustained by the text of your report. I was surprised,
because, if we did differ in opinion as to the measures and purposes of
contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate place in the
report of a battle Further, because it seemed to be an attempt to exalt
yourself at my expense, and especially because no such plan as that
described was submitted to me. It is true that some time before it was
ordered you expressed a desire for the junction of General Johnston's army
with your own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the enemy
rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby practicable to make it,
with safety, to the valley of Virginia; hence-I believe was secured the
success by which it was attended. If you have retained a copy of the plan of
campaign which, you say, was submitted to me, through Colonel Chesnut, allow
me to request that you will furnish me with a duplicate of it.
Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
RICHMOND, VA., October 30, 1861.
Col. JAMES CHESNUT, Camden, S. C:
MY DEAR SIR: I beg that you will as promptly as possible send me a
statement of a communication made to me by yourself on or about July 13
last, as aide of General Beauregard, in relation to any proposed plan of
battle or campaign. I ask this because I have had my attention directed to a
synopsis in the newspapers of General Beauregard's report so entirely at
variance with the facts as they occurred that I think it well to recur to
your recollection of the message brought by you from the general.
I am, very truly, your friend,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
CAMDEN, S.C., November 9, 1861.
To the PRESIDENT:
DEAR SIR: I have this morning received your letter of the 15th [30] ultimo,(*)
and, according to your request, reply at once, although you will not get
[it] as promptly as I desire, as to-morrow, being Sunday, no mail leaves
this place.
You ask me to recur to my recollection and send you a statement of a
communication which, as aide to General Beauregard, I made to you on or
about July 13, last, "in relation to any proposed plan of battle or
campaign."
On Saturday night or Sunday morning of July 14 last, about midnight I
received a message from General Beauregard, requesting my attendance at his
room. I immediately repaired thither, and learned from him that he
had formed a plan of campaign which he desired to lay before the President,
and requested me to undertake the duty.
About 6 o'clock of the same morning I left headquarters and arrived in
Richmond in the afternoon of the same day, several hours beyond the usual
time of arrival. I had two interviews with you that day, one in the
afternoon and another in company with other persons during the evening.
Remaining Monday for the completion of my mission, I returned to camp at
Manassas on Tuesday following. Immediately after reaching headquarters of
General Beauregard I made to him verbally a full report of all things
touching the subject matter with which I had been charged.
On Thursday, July 18 last, while we were preparing for the field, the
general in person directed me to make at once a written report of the same
matter. This I did, and handed it to the assistant adjutant general, Colonel
Jordan, who filed it for information of the general commanding, when I left
the camp to join the general on the battle-field. I think the written report
bears date of the verbal report, say July 15 last, and I am sure is accurate
and full to the points in question, according to the freshness of my
recollection at the time. I will ask you, however, to write to General
Beauregard requesting a copy of the report, as I myself will do.
In the mean time and now I will state to you my recollection of the
interview and of the contents of the report. I am sure the two will be found
identical in substance, however they may vary in phraseology. I stated to
General Beauregard that when I arrived in Richmond I repaired
immediately to your apartment,
where I learned you were ill in bed; but upon being notified of my presence
you at once caused me to be invited into your chamber, where I was kindly
and cordially received. I informed you of the object of my visit at which
you expressed yourself pleased, and sent messages to Generals Cooper and Lee
to meet us that evening at 7 o'clock, with maps, in your parlor. I requested
you to allow Col. John S. Preston, who was then in Richmond, to be present
at the interview, to which you consented.
At the time and place appointed yourself and Generals Cooper and Lee and
Colonel Preston and myself assembled. You stated to the gentlemen present
that I had come with a message from General Beauregard, which you then
requested me to explain, whereupon I submitted on the part of General
Beauregard the following propositions:
That we were standing in front of the enemy with inferior forces at all
points; that it was desirable, by uniting a portion of our forces, to
outnumber the enemy at some important point; that the most important point
was the one at Manassas, and that the indication then was that the enemy
would soon advance upon us by the Alexandria and by the Loudoun and
Hampshire Railroad, having then his advanced force, 8,000 or 10,000 Strong,
at or near Falls Church; that it was probable he would continue the movement
towards Vienna, Frying Pan, and Pleasant Valley to Hay Market, on the
Manassas Gap Railroad, with a view to cut off General Johnston from us by
sending a few thousand men to take possession of the passes in the Blue
Ridge, namely, Manassas Gap, Ashby's Gap, and Turkersville [Snicker's] Gap,
and then probably attempt to cut off our communication with Richmond by the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and force us to fight him with great odds in
an open country, or to retire towards Fredericksburg by way of Brentsville,
to join our forces with those of General Holmes, or to withdraw from our
intrenched camp at Manassas by the Orange [and Alexandria] Railroad before
the enemy could reach it; that the enemy was also advancing part of his
force on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad on our front, with a view
probably of covering his movements on our left by threatening our center and
right with a force of about 10.000 men.
In view of this condition of things General Beauregard, through me, at that
time proposed that General Johnston should at once join him with the larger
portion of his force, say 20,000, leaving from 3,000 to 5,000 to occupy and
guard the gaps already mentioned and to hold General Patterson in check;
then, with the combined forces of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, make a
rapid march forward on Fairfax; establish themselves between the two lines
of the enemy; attack them separately and successfully, and thus exterminate
them. This being done, General Johnston would return and attack Patterson
with a force of about 35,000 men, made up of about 10,000 of General
Beauregard's and 20,000 of his own, and gathering up on his return the 5,000
which were left to guard the passes. All this it was thought could be done
in one week from the time that General Johnston should leave Winchester. In
the mean time General Beauregard, with the 10,000, or about that, left with
him, would either hold his position, or occupy the works of the enemy in
front of Washington, if abandoned, according to circumstances. After General
Johnston should take or defeat Patterson it was proposed that he should send
from his command a force sufficient to General Garnett to outnumber and
destroy General McClellan, Garnett in the mean time having received orders
to fall back in the direction of Johnston's column. McClellan being disposed
of, General Garnett would unite his forces with General Johnston's, and
both cross the Potomac at the
nearest point into Maryland, march on Washington, taking it in the rear,
while General Beauregard attacked it in front, General Johnston in the mean
time arousing the people of Maryland wherever he passed to the defense of
their homes and independence.
After I had laid before you, these views, both yourself and General Lee
spoke in terms of kindness and compliment to General Beauregard; thought the
plan well conceived, and might be brilliant in its results if we should meet
with no disaster in the details, and if the time for its execution had
arrived. General Lee expressed the opinion, to which you assented, that the
time for its execution had not yet arrived. With deference I asked General
Lee for the reason upon which the opinion was founded. He proceeded to say
the subject had been thought of generally. He thought the enemy was as yet
too close to his cover; that if he found us with combined and superior
forces before him he would not, or might not, give battle, but retire behind
the protection of the guns of his intrenchments, and thus defeat the objects
of our combination; that in such an event we would be put to a great
disadvantage of achieving nothing and leaving the other points exposed, &c.;
that in his opinion it would be better to draw the enemy farther from his
intrenchments, and by lengthening to weaken his line, which would give us a
better chance of success, &c.
Many other matters were spoken of at that interview as to the war generally,
its policy the character of our forces, &c.; but as they did not pertain to
the object of my mission, they were not mentioned in my report nor are
repeated here.
I believe I have given you the sum and substance of what occurred at the
interview referred to in relation to the matter in question, and what is
contained in the report which I made in writing to General Beauregard. I do
not at this time pretend to verbal accuracy, but feel satisfied of the
correctness of the substance of the matter. I had at the time, and I have
before me now, a memorandum of the points submitted by me on the part of
General Beauregard.
I am sure a full and dispassionate investigation and consideration of this
subject will leave little ground for dissatisfaction. The success of our
cause depends not merely on the ability and fidelity, but to a great extent
also on the harmony and hearty co-operation, of those who are chief and
chosen instruments in the direction of our affairs. Any extended
distrust in the crisis of our fate will bring dire calamities upon us. We
must heed not the unwise babbling of some nor the deliberate malice of many.
Yourself and your generals are alike elevated above the reach of unworthy
considerations. Firm in the consciousness of right, devoting all your
faculties to the triumph of a common and a noble cause, you and they can
already afford to live in the clear light of a future judgment.
With great respect, your friend and obedient servant,
JAMES CHESNUT, JR.
-----
RICHMOND, VA., November 3, 1861.
General J. E. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Department of the Potomac:
SIR: Reports have been and are being widely circulated to the effect
that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle
of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing
upon Washington City. Though
such statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that view
might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have acquired
importance from the fact that they have served to create distrust, to excite
disappointment, and must embarrass the administration in its further efforts
to re-enforce the armies of the Potomac, and, generally, to provide for the
public defense. For these public considerations I call upon you, as the
commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on July
21 and 22, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the
victory at Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active
operations which it was feasible for the Army to undertake.
Very respectfully, yours &c.,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
RICHMOND, VA.. November 4, 1861.
Generals COOPER and LEE, C. S. Army:
GENTLEMEN: The injurious effect produced by state, ants, widely published,
to show that the Army or the Potomac had been needlessly doomed to
inactivity by my rejection of plans for vigorous movements against the enemy
which were presented to me by General Beauregard, induces me to ask you to
state what was the communication made by that officer through the Hon. Mr.
Chesnut, on the subject of his position at Manassas in July last, and what
were the propositions and requests then conveyed to me. You are invited to
refer to the introduction of General Beauregard's report of the battle of
Manassas, that you may see how far the statement made therein agrees with
the communication made to me by the Hon. Mr. Chesnut in the interview at
which you were present.
I have requested General Beauregard to furnish me with a duplicate of the
plan of battle and campaign, which he says in his report was submitted to
me, but have not received an answer.
Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
RICHMOND, VA. November 9, 1861.
To his Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President of Confederate States:
SIR: In reply to your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honor to state
that I was present at an interview in the parlor of the Spottswood Hotel, on
the occasion referred to in General Beauregard's introductory remarks in his
report of the battle of Manassas, wherein he states that he dispatched, on
July 13, one of his staff, Col. James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to submit
to the consideration of the President a plan of operations, &c.
My impression in respect to that interview is that General Beauregard, being
fully satisfied that an early attack would be made on his position by the
enemy, greatly superior in force, and feeling the necessity for additional
aid to enable him to give battle on more equal terms, had sent Colonel
Chesnut to urge upon the President an increase from General Johnston's
command, then in the valley of the Shenandoah. I am also under the
impression that it was represented on the part of General Beauregard that,
if compelled to abandon his position by superior numbers, he would retire by
Fredericksburg, or in the direction of the Rappahannock. Beyond these
representations or suggestions I am not sensible that any plan of operations
was submitted, whether written or oral; nor can I call to mind that any
written communication from General Beauregard was made to the President on
the occasion of the interview. In respect to receiving aid from General
Johnston, it will be recollected that that officer had in his front a large
force of the enemy, at least double his own numbers, and it would have been
fatal to our cause in the valley to have sent away at that time any
considerable portion of his command for the object contemplated by General
Beauregard. Nor was it possible for him to do so, with any reasonable hope
of success, until the tardiness and inactivity of the enemy in his front
rendered such movement practicable, when it was finally accomplished under
your telegraphic instructions of July 17, which resulted in the success of
our arms at the battle of Manassas on the 21st.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
S. COOPER,
General, C. S Army.
-----
RICHMOND, VA., November 1!, 1861.
Col. JAMES CHESNUT:
MY DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 2d instant, in
reply to my inquiry of the 30th ultimo.(*) My memory is confirmed as
to the fact that you delivered to me orally a message from General
Beauregard, but left with me no plan of battle or of campaign; and I regret,
as our conversation was to be reported and to be filed with the papers of
General Beauregard, that the propositions were not reduced to writing and
submitted for a written reply, or at least that I was not permitted to see
the report of the interview before it became a public document. I well
remember that you came to explain the hazard of General Beauregard's
position, and to ask for re-enforcements, suggesting that General Johnston
should make a junction with him; but do not remember that any proposition
was made to select Fairfax Court-House as a battle-field, and cannot realize
how I should have objected to the choice of that field, as I did not then
know how bad a selection it would have been. The rest seems to have been
merely hypothetical propositions, and such as would only have impressed
themselves on my memory by their errors, both as to numbers of available
troops and topography of the country. The general's report does not give
those details, but presents a summary of things which no one desired more
than myself, with a conclusion that the plan for their achievement was not
accepted, &c Thus has apparent confirmation been given to the slander that I
would not permit the Army to advance to the capture of Washington and the
liberation of Maryland, attributing to me political views which I think you
must know were not entertained by me. The importance of this is not any
effect it may have on me individually, but is the injury inflicted on the
public interest by the belief created that the
Army has been doomed to inactivity, to avoid the exasperation of the enemy.
That I have not heeded "the unwise babbling of some nor the deliberate
malice of many," is to be found in the fact that they were never noticed by
me until a respectable foundation appeared for them. My confidence and
friendship for General Beauregard have been unmistakably manifested, and
none can regret more than myself the error he has committed in bringing
extraneous matter into his report of a battle, without any perceivable
motive for so doing which is consistent with the good opinion I entertained
of him. To a request for a duplicate of the plan of battle and campaign,
which he had reported was submitted to me through you, he replies by
assuring me that the plan, as stated in his report, is the one you were sent
to submit-that he has a written statement of the result of your conference
with me, which has been sent to New Orleans, and of which he promises to
furnish a copy.
Your letter shows that you bore merely a message from General Beauregard,
and his official announcement of a plan of operations submitted but not
accepted is poorly sustained by reference to a conversation with me by a
third person, even though it was reduced to writing after having been orally
communicated to him. When the newspapers published a synopsis of General
Beauregard's report, in which reference is made to the plan said to have
been submitted to me by him, I could not believe he was responsible for the
statement until I saw his report.
I accept your friendly advice in the spirit which suggests it, and can
assure you that our cause is to me so far above any personal considerations,
that I can find no difficulty in fully co-operating with any one who can and
will promote its success.
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
-----
RICHMOND, November 12, 1861.
General G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Comdg. District of Potomac, Centreville,
Va.:
GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 8th instant,(*) and in
compliance with your request have caused to be affixed to your report of the
battle of Manassas the date of your letter of the 14th October, which
accompanied it, although this was unnecessary, inasmuch as the letter had
already been filed with the report itself.
In respect to the strategic portion of the report as an obstacle to its
publication, I would remark that it is a rule of the Department to furnish
copies of reports of battles only to Congress, by whose authority alone they
are printed. Under this rule they are withheld from publication by the
Department in the daily papers. Some few of these reports of battles have
found their way into the papers, but the newspapers obtained their copies
before the reports reached this office.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. COOPER,
Adjt. and Insp. Gen.
P. S.--I am unable to account for the irregularity of the mails between this
city and Centreville, and this reminds me that I duly received your note of
the 23d October, in which you asked for information in respect to
aides-de-camp and other matters, and to which I promptly replied as fully as
I had the means of doing, offering at the same time to supply
you with anything in addition
that you might require. I was surprised to learn from Colonel Deas a few
days ago that you had never received my answer.
S. C.
-----
COOSAWHATCHIE, S.C., November 24, 1861.
His Excellency THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFEDERATE STATES:
My absence on an examination of the coast of South Carolina and Georgia has
prevented until now my reply to your note of the 4th instant, asking what
communication was made by General Beauregard to you through the honorable
Mr. Chesnut on the subject of his position at Manassas in July last, and
what were the propositions and requests conveyed by him.
I have not seen the report of General Beauregard of the battle of Manassas,
and am unable to refer to his introductory statement to which you call my
attention. I cannot, therefore, say how far it agrees with the communication
of Mr. Chesnut, I recollect, however, that at the interview at which I was
present Mr. Chesnut urged, on the part of General Beauregard, the importance
of re-enforcing the Army of the Potomac to enable it to oppose the Federal
forces accumulating in its front. As a means of accomplishing this end he
suggested that a portion of the Army in the Shenandoah Valley, under General
Johnston, be ordered to join it. With the aid thus afforded General
Beauregard thought he could successfully resist an attack of the enemy.
Should he succeed in repulsing him, he could in turn re-enforce General
Johnston. Should General Johnston succeed in driving back General Patterson,
then in his front, he could re-enforce the Army in Northwestern Virginia.
The advantages of the union of the armies on the Potomac had been more than
once the subject of consideration by you, and I do not recollect that at the
interview in question they were less apparent. The difficulty of timing the
march of the troops so as to benefit one army without jeopardizing the
object of the other was therefore mainly considered, and you decided that
the movements of the enemy in and about Alexandria were not sufficiently
demonstrative to warrant the withdrawing of any of the forces from the
Shenandoah Valley. A few days afterwards, how-ever--I think three or
four--the reports from General Beauregard showed so clearly the enemy's
purpose, that you ordered General Johnston, with his effective force, to
march at once to the support of General Beauregard, and directed General
Holmes, with such troops as could be spared from the defense of the
approaches to Fredericksburg, to move upon Manassas.
The successful combination of the armies was made, and the glorious victory
of July 21 followed.
I have the honor, &c.,
R. E. LEE,
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Campaigns, Battles, Incidents and Affairs
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